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The approach of the European Court of Human 
Rights (the “Court”) to alternative civilian service 
(ACS) has been developing for a long time, 
and the process is not yet complete. The jurisprudence 
of the European Commission of Human 
Rights (the “Commission”) is therefore 
important. Art. 4 § 3(b) of the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (the “Convention”) states 
that, for the purposes of Art. 4, service exacted 
in place of compulsory military service is not 
forced or compulsory labour in countries that 
recognize conscientious objection. For a long 
time the Commission has taken this norm as 
lex specialis (a specific rule of law which prevails 
over the general) in relation to Articles 9 
and 14 of the Convention and declared complaints 
relating to ACS inadmissible. Even in 
1996, in considering the application Olcina 
Portilla v. Spain, (No. 31474/96,14.10.96) the 
Commission insisted that the Convention “does 
not guarantee as such the right to conscientious 
objection and the substitution of civilian 
service for military service1”. 
However, the Commission has often delivered 
important judgments in its admissibility decisions. 
For example, in Autio v. Finland (No. 
17086/90,6.12.91) the Commission considered 
a law which abolished the inquiry procedure, 
intended to establish the genuineness of an 
objector’s convictions, but prolonged the term 
of ACS from 11 to 16 months (compared to 8 
months of military service). The applicant complained 
that such legislation amounted to discrimination 
on the basis of his convictions, 
which prevented him from bearing arms. The 
Commission noted that this application fell 
within Art. 9 of the Convention (although a state 
is not obliged to grant ACS) and thus, Art. 14 
also applied. The Commission established a 
link between the length of the ACS and the 
presence of the inquiry procedure: the extension 
of the ACS term in comparison to the term 
of the military service was not disproportionate 
given that the inquiry procedure had been 
abolished2. 
The Court’s Grand Chamber judgment in the 
case of Thlimmenos v. Greece (2000) represented 
a turning point. The applicant was convicted 
and imprisoned for refusing to undertake 
military service and demanding to be allowed to 
substitute ACS. After his release he was refused 
the right to become a chartered accountant 
as he had been convicted of an offence. 
The Commission declared the application admissible 
under both Art. 9 and Art. 14 in conjunction 
with Art. 9. The Commission’s report, 
submitted to the Court on the basis of former 
Art. 31 of the Convention, as well as the partially 
dissenting opinion of six of its members 
(C.L.Rozakis, J.Liddy, B.Marxer, M.A.Nowicki, 
B.Conforti, N.Bratza), are of particular interest. 
The majority of the Commission found a violation 
of Art 14 (taken together with Art. 9) because 
the consequences of the conviction were 
disproportionate, given the absence of any link 
between the conviction and the profession of 
accountant3. The Commission found that the 
Greek authorities had failed to justify, on an 
objective and reasonable basis, the equal treatment 
of people who had committed different 
crimes in treating the applicant like any other 
convicted criminal. The majority also found that 
it was unnecessary to consider whether the 
conviction was necessary in a democratic society 
or whether it had been a violation of Art. 94. 
It is also necessary to analyze the joint dissenting 
opinion of six members of the Commission 
as, in its decision on the merits, the Court followed 
some of their reasoning. The minority 
suggested that Art. 9 and Art. 11 of the Convention 
(freedom of assembly and association) 
would be applicable in the case of compulsory 
military service. Because refusal to undertake 
military service may give rise to criminal responsibility, 
an objector is forced to join an association 
with values that are alien to him. The 
minority opinion held that the freedom to practise 
one’s religion in public, while refusing to do 
military service, fell within Art. 9 § 1 of the Convention, 
subject to limitations of Art. 9 § 2. 
The minority thought it necessary to analyze 
the case from the perspective of Art. 9 of the 
Convention. In their view, the consequences of 
the applicant’s conviction amounted to an interference 
with his freedom to practise his religion. 
Since the law, excluding convicted criminals 
from the accountancy profession, pursued the 
objective of maintaining public order and protecting 
the rights and freedoms of others, the 
issue of whether the interference was necessary 
in the democratic society also had to be 
considered. 
In its judgment on the merits the Court established 
that the applicant’s complaint fell within 
the terms of Art. 9. It did not consider the arguments 
of the Commission regarding interfer- 
ence with his freedom to practise his religion on 
the basis of the consequences of his criminal 
conviction. The Court found that he objected to 
military service solely by virtue of his religion. 
As a consequence, he was treated as any other 
person convicted of a serious crime, even 
though his conviction resulted from the exercise 
of the right to religious freedom guaranteed in 
Article 9 itself5. 
The Court noted that “unlike other convictions 
for criminal offences, a conviction for refusing, 
on religious or philosophical grounds, to wear 
military uniform cannot imply any dishonesty or 
moral turpitude likely to undermine the offender’s 
ability to exercise [the] profession”6. 
The lack of differential treatment was found to 
violate Art. 14 taken together with Art. 9 of the 
Convention. To achieve this conclusion, the 
Court almost exactly followed the argument of 
the Commission’s minority (§ 8 of the joint dissenting 
opinion). 
The Court did not consider the question 
whether the refusal to undertake military service 
can be a violation of Art. 9 of the Convention, 
despite the wording of Art. 4 § 3 (b). This 
question was not put before the Court even 
though the applicant asked the Court to rule 
that “the Commission’s case-law, to the effect 
that the Convention did not guarantee the right 
to conscientious objection to military service, 
had to be reviewed in the light of the presentday 
conditions. Virtually all Contracting States 
now recognised the right to alternative civilian 
service”7. 
Analysis of the Federal Law of 25 July 2002 No. 
113-FZ “On Alternative Civil Service”8, especially 
in relation to the possibility of undertaking 
ACS in military units, without the citizens’ consent, 
gives grounds to assert that after its coming 
into force the Court will expand its practice 
on this problem, in connection with complaints 
submitted by Russian applicants. 
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